

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
OF
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE
AUGUST 1964

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S E C R E T

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I. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

Mission, Functions, and Organization

1. The primary mission of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), as assigned by DCID No. 3/5, is to fulfill the Agency's responsibility for the production of Scientific and Technical (S&T) intelligence as a service of common concern and as required to fulfill the statutory responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence. For six and one-half years from 1952 until 1959, OSI had to build its competence in the technical field in the face of a policy authorization (DCID No. 3/4, 14 August 1952) which gave to the military the primary responsibility for production of technical intelligence and gave to CIA production responsibility only for basic scientific intelligence.

2. The principal conclusion of this report is that what is needed most in OSI is an end to reorganizations. Much of the current unrest in OSI, and its level is high, may be attributed in considerable measure to the organizational instability of the office. The structure has undergone repeated change throughout the office's existence, but the reorganizations most contributory to the current unrest are the major reorganization in the fall of 1961 and the three smaller ones since then.

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Production of Scientific and Technical Intelligence

3. We found OSI's production philosophy undergoing review and change at the time of our survey. Traditionally, OSI's principal intelligence product has been in the form of contributions to National Intelligence Estimates and publication of detailed analytical studies. The analytical studies often were unduly long and were not realistically related to the needs of decision makers. Production of S&T current intelligence has received little attention, and the responsibility has been assumed by OCI through default by OSI. The AD/SI has recently reoriented the office production philosophy to place emphasis on shorter, more readable analytical studies better keyed to the needs of policy makers and to stress the importance of current intelligence production.

4. It often takes an inordinate length of time to move reports through OSI's reviewing mechanism. The delay has on occasion been upwards of a year from the time the paper appeared in draft until it was finally disseminated. The delays result, not from individual inefficiencies, but from a policy of separate reviews of each paper at successive echelons of command. We see as a solution nothing short of a deliberate decision to move paper more rapidly by delegation of authority to the lowest acceptable level of command.

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c. Contractors with previous experience in working with OSI know better what is expected and usually are the better performers.

d. The length of the project has much to do with the quality of the product. It may take several months to get clearances, establish support arrangements, and get the contractor headed in the direction we intend him to take. Often OSI is in a poor position to assess results at the end of a one-year contract.

18. Our only real criticism of OSI's external analysis program has to do with the past rather than with the present. There is evidence of a tendency over years past to continue projects that were not producing commensurate with cost. In some cases, projects have been renewed largely to preserve existing assets that could not quickly be recreated if required by a crash need. Some have been retained because they appeared to have an unrealized potential that might one day be exploited. Some have persisted beyond immediate needs. Some have grown in cost without an equivalent increase in worth. We think this is being corrected. We found the AD/SI taking a critical look at projects up for renewal. Several that fail to meet the criterion of value received per dollar spent are being terminated.

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